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THE SOUTH CAROLINA UNFAIR
TRADE PRACTICES ACT: SLEEPING
GIANT OR ILLUSIVE PANACEA?
RICHARD E. DAY*
The need for local consumer legislation is urgent .... The
"South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act," implemented by
the Attorney General, could effectively control and eventually
eliminate the large scale use of unfair and deceptive trade
practices in South Carolina.1
The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA),2 a
product of the consumer movement that began in the 1960s,3
was enacted by the South Carolina General Assembly in 1971.
4
The enactment adopted Alternative Form Number 1 of the Un-
fair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, which was
developed by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in collabo-
ration with various state officials and was adopted by the Coun-
cil of State Governments' Committee of State Officials on Sug-
gested State Legislation.5 Because the UTPA is identical to
section 5 of the FTC Act,6 it is often called the "Little FTC
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. B.S. 1951, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1957, University of Michigan.
1. Note, Consumer Protection and the Proposed "South Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act," 22 S.C.L. REV. 767, 787 (1970).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10 to -160 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
3. COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL AssOcIATION OF
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, 395 (1971) [herein-
after cited as 1971 REPORT]; Leafier & Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or
Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission Jurispru-
dence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (1981); Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legis-
lation, 46 TuL. L. REV. 724 (1972).
Every state but Alabama has enacted some form of consumer protection legislation.
Leafier & Lipson, supra, at 521 n.1.
4. 1971 S.C. Acts 369, No. 287.
5. 1971 REPORT, supra note 3, at 398; Leafier & Lipson, supra note 3, at 522; Lovett,
supra note 3, at 730.
6. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976). The Wheeler-
Lea Act, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), expanded the language of section 5 to prohibit unfair or
deceptive acts or practices without the necessity of showing anticompetitive effect, which
the United States Supreme Court had held necessary in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S.
479
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Act." It prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices . . .
The UTPA provides for enforcement by the attorney gen-
eral and by private plaintiffs.8 In addition, with the attorney
general's approval, the solicitors of each judicial circuit and
county and city attorneys may bring state actions.9 The Act per-
mits the state to seek injunctions,10 restitution for injured per-
sons,"1 civil penalties,1 2 and the dissolution, suspension, or forfei-
643 (1931).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(a) (1976 & Supp. 1980). In addition to these general
prohibitions, the Act expressly declares "pyramid" clubs and similar operations to be
unfair trade practices. Id. § 39-5-30 (1976).
Comments to the model legislation explain that this alternative "enables the en-
forcement official to reach not only deceptive practices that prey upon consumers, but
also unfair methods that injure competition. This form will reach price fixing arrange-
ments, boycotts by suppliers, coercion of retailers, and other trade restraints which tend
to create monopolies and enhance prices." COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1970 SUG-
GESTED STATE LEGISLATION 141, quoted in 1971 REPORT, supra note 3, at 399. The other
two alternatives in the model act are limited to consumer protection. Alternative Form
Number 2 prohibits "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices." 1971 REPORT,
supra note 3, at 399. Alternative Form Number 3 prohibits the twelve specific deceptive
practices contained in the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 7A UNIFORM L. ANN.,
Business & Finance Laws § 2 (1978); Lovett, supra note 3, at 732 n.4, and contains a
thirteenth "catch-all" prohibition against "engaging in any other act or practice which is
unfair or deceptive to the consumer." 1971 REPORT, supra note 3, at 399; Lovett, supra
note 3, at 733.
In promoting state adoption of Little FTC Acts, the FTC stressed its inability to
provide protection against unfair trade practices at the local level. Lovett, supra note 3,
at 729 n.10, 736. First, the FTC Act does not cover those local practices that do not
affect interstate commerce. Second, despite strong policy arguments to the contrary, the
FTC Act does not provide for a private cause of action. See Gard, Purpose and Promise
Unfulfilled. A Different View of Private Enforcement Under the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 274 (1975). Federal courts have generally refused to imply
a private tort action for violation of the FTC Act. See Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d
279, 280 (9th Cir. 1973); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
But cf. Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 587 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (private action
permitted to enforce terms of FTC order). Amendments to the FTC Act to create a
private cause of action have been offered in Congress but have not passed. See H.R.
3816, 95th Cong., 1st Seass. (1970); H.R. REP. No. 95-339, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-17
(1976); S. 1288, 94th Cong., 2d Seass. (1976); S. 642, 94th Cong., 1st Seass. (1975). Simply
put, the FTC does not have the resources or power to police all the unfair or deceptive
trade practices; it must look to state agencies and private plaintiffs for assistance. The
UTPA was designed to fulfill this need.
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (1976).
9. Id. § 39-5-130.
10. Id. § 39-5-50(a).
11. Id. § 39-5-50(b).
12. Id. § 39-5-110.
2
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ture of a corporate charter or franchise."3 Furthermore, it
authorizes the attorney general to issue investigative demands14
and subpoenas.1 5 Private plaintiffs may recover damages and, in
the case of willful violations, treble damages."' Successful plain-
tiffs are also entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and such
other relief as the court may deem "necessary and proper.117 A
permanent injunction, judgment, or order issued in a state ac-
tion is prima facie evidence of a violation in a private action on
the same facts."8
The UTPA includes a legislative mandate that state courts
"will be guided by"'9 FTC and federal court interpretations of
section 5 of the FTC Act "as from time to time amended.
'20
Federal precedent provides an extensive list of violations, and
excellent reporting services and treatises on trade *regulation
law2' supplement the usual research sources in this area. In ad-
dition, the FTC has collected key decisions and prepared synop-
13. Id. § 39-5-120.
14. Id. § 39-5-70, -100.
15. Id. § 39-5-80.
16. Id. § 39-5-140(a).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 39-5-140(c).
19. Id. § 39-5-20(b).
20. Id. The Commission's interpretations take many forms. The FTC holds public
hearings and promulgates trade regulation rules that have the same substantive effect as
final adjudicatory decisions and orders. These rules should have full precedential status
under the UTPA. More questionable are other forms of FTC interpretations, including
unresolved complaints, consent orders, stipulations, advisory opinions, trade practice
rules, and industry guides, which are not enforceable as substantive law and have no
general precedential value. Compare Whittinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, - Mass. -, 390
N.E.2d 243, 252 (1979) (FTC consent orders not authoritative interpretations of federal
law) with State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 529 (Alaska 1980) (FTC
consent orders viewed as FTC interpretations with full precedential value). See also
Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 3, at 534 n.85. Nevertheless, they represent the Commis-
sion's considered interpretations of section 5 and are usually based on decisional prece-
dent. In effect, the legislative direction to the state courts is inherently ambiguous.
21. Bibliographical references and research sources are listed in S. OPPENHEIM, G.
WESTON & J. McCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTIusT LAWS 1-3 (4th ed. 1981)[hereinafter Op-
PENHEIM, WESTON, & McCARTHY]. In addition, the FTC has indicated its intent "to re-
consider and, if appropriate, promulgate into trade regulation rules the principles of con-
sumer protection law which it has developed in the course of deciding individual cases
and accepting individual consent agreements." Proposed Trade Regulation Rules Em-
bodying Case Law Principles, 16 C.F.R. 1; 41 Fed. Reg. 3322 (Jan. 22, 1976). This mas-
sive project, if completed, should provide a veritable hornbook for the consumer protec-
tion bar.
3
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ses of decisions in many areas of section 5 enforcement, 22 which
may be used to establish not only UTPA violations but also will-
ful violations that give rise to treble damages.
In addition to providing a body of useful precedent, the
UTPA incorporates federal principles of general applicability
that can provide guidance for courts confronting novel claims of
deception or unfairness. For example, courts in many states have
endorsed the FTC's broad "capacity-to-deceive" standard,"3
which renders irrelevant to a UTPA action the common-law ele-
ments of fraud and deceit.24 Under this standard, the inquiry
focuses on the effect of a seller's conduct on the consumer rather
than on the seller's intent,25 and the consumer need not prove
the right to rely on the deception.26 Several state courts have
adopted the FTC's expanded theory of unfairness, 2 and one
court has held that the statutory mandate to follow federal in-
terpretations of the FTC Act indicates that state courts "are
now free to find methods, acts or practices not heretofore specif-
ically declared unlawful by the FTC or the federal courts pro-
hibited by the [UTPA] .... ))28
This article examines the FTC Act's standards and the
problems that may arise in their application, the limitations on
22. FTC synopses of decisions in thirty-one areas of enforcement are reprinted in
Peterson, The Use of FTC Programs as a Basis for Suit Under State-FTC Acts, in 2
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, FTC CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW INSTITUTE 919, 957-65
(1980).
23. Guggenheimer v. Ginzberg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 272, 37 N.E.2d 17, 19, 401 N.Y.S.2d
182, 134 (1977). See also People v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 47 A.D.2d 868, 868, 366
N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (1975); notes 54-76 and accompanying text infra.
24. See, e.g., Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., - Mass. _, 282 N.E.2d 1065, 1069
(1978); Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 703, 322 N.E.2d 768, 779 (1975);
Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975).
25. See Grimes v. Aldesperger, 67 IM. App. 3d 582, 585, 384 N.E.2d 537, 539 (1978);
Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 51, 554 P.2d 349, 358 (1976).
26. Perry v. Hansen, 120 Ariz. 266, 269-70, 585 P.2d 574, 577 (1978).
27. See, e.g., Murphy v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 189, 416 A.2d 170, 175
(1979); Covenant Radio Corp. v. Ten Eighty Corp., 35 Conn. Supp. 1, 9, 390 A.2d 9,49,
955 (1977), Dan Lorenz, Inc. v. Northampton Nat'l Bank, - Mass. App. Ct. -, -, 381
N.E.2d 1108, 1109 (1978); Frank J. Linhares Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 4 Mass. App. Ct.
617, 623, 357 N.E.2d 313, 318 (1976); State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C.
311, 315, 233 S.E.2d 895, 898 (1977); Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459
Pa. 450, 464, 329 A.2d 812, 818 (1974); Christie v. Dalmig, Inc., 136 Vt. 597, 601, 396 A.2d
1385, 1388 (1979).
28. Murphy v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 187 n.4, 416 A.2d 170, 174 n.4
(1979).
4
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the UTPA's scope, the remedies it offers, and the manner in
which the Act is now being enforced. Finally, the article offers a
series of proposals to improve enforcement of the UTPA in a
manner consistent with the practices of the United States Jus-
tice Department and federal court intepretations of section 5 of
the FTC Act.
I. FTC ACT STANDARDS
Like section 5 of the FTC Act, the UTPA prohibits both
unfair or deceptive acts or practices (consumer protection) and
anticompetitive conduct (antitrust proscription).2 The UTPA,
by incorporating FTC and federal court interpretations of sec-
tion 5 of the FTC Act,30 gives state courts wide latitude to define
acceptable business practices in the state. Because FTC stan-
dards have been developed by and for an administrative agency
with remedial powers akin to a court of equity, 1 however,
problems arise when their application in UTPA actions may re-
sult in civil penalties and treble damages.2
A. Consumer Protection Standards
1. Capacity to Deceive.
a. Literal truthfulness.-The FTC has continually pressed to
expand its theories of deceptive practices far beyond the narrow
common-law concept. In Charles of the Ritz Distributing Corp.
v. FTC,33 the Commission found that respondent's advertising
falsely represented that its cosmetic cream would rejuvenate and
restore the skin "regardless of the condition of the skin or the
age of the user. '3 4 Upholding a cease and desist order against
this advertisement, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was un-
concerned that the FTC had not produced consumers to testify
to their deception and observed that "actual deception of the
public need not be shown" in section 5 proceedings.3 5 According
29. See note 7 supra.
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (1976).
31. See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
32. See notes 160-187 and accompanying text infra.
33. 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944).
34. Id. at 678.
35. Id. at 680.
1982] 483
5
Day: The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act: Sleeping Giant or
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to the court, the proper standard is not deception but merely a
"capacity to deceive." 36 Under this standard, the primary test is
the "net impression which the advertisement is likely to make
on the general populace, ' ' 37 and the FTC may require "literal
truthfulness" 38 in advertisements and insist "upon a form of ad-
vertising clear enough so that, in the words of the prophet
Isaiah, 'wayfaring men, though fools, shall not err therein.' ,s
Clearly, the common-law doctrine of caveat emptor has long
been dead, at least regarding advertising claims under the FTC
Act.
Although the courts have given the FTC broad authority to
apply the capacity-to-deceive test, the FTC has recognized the
need for some limitation. For example, the Commission declined
a strict application of the standard in Heinz W. Kirchner,' in
which the complaint challenged, in part, respondent's represen-
tation that its inflatable swimming aid was "INVISIBLE under
bathing suit or swim trunks.' ' 41 Although the Commission ac-
knowledged its responsibility to protect "the gullible and credu-
lous, as well as the cautious and knowledgeable," it nevertheless
found that the complainant had failed to prove capacity to
deceive.'2 According to the Commission, "[t]his principle loses
its validity. . . if it is applied uncritically or pushed to an ab-
surd extreme,"'4 and "[a] representation does not become 'false
and deceptive' merely because it will be unreasonably misunder-
stood by an insignificant and unrepresentative segment of the
class of persons to whom the representation is addressed."
44
A corollary to the rule that capacity to deceive must be de-
termined from the net impression a representation creates is
that literal truth may nevertheless be deceptive if incomplete. In
P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC,45 respondent "truthfully" advertised
that an impartial test by Reader's Digest found that among six
36. Id.
37. Id.
38, Moretrench Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942).
39. 143 F.2d at 680 (quoting General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 682 (1941)).
40. 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963), affd, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964).
41. Id. at 1283.
42. Id. at 1290.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 186 F.2d 52, 57 (4th Cir. 1950).
[Vol. 33
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other leading brands, its Old Gold cigarettes were "lowest in nic-
otine . . . [and] lowest in throat-irritating tars and resins." '46
The advertisement did not, however, disclose the article's con-
clusion that the differences in tar and nicotine were "practically
speaking, small, and no single brand is so superior to its compet-
itors as to justify its selection on the ground that it is less harm-
ful. '47 Upholding an FTC order enjoining respondent from rep-
resenting directly or indirectly that its cigarettes were lower in
nicotine or tars and resins or were less irritating than others, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that "[t]o tell less
than the whole truth is a well known method of deception; and
he who deceives by resorting to such method cannot excuse the
deception by relying upon the truthfulness per se of the partial
truth by which it has been accomplished.
'48
b. Undisclosed use of demonstration props.-Ironically, al-
though literal truthfulness cannot save a representation that has
the capacity to deceive, a representation lacking the capacity to
deceive nevertheless violates section 5 if its accurate net impres-
sion is accomplished by deceptive means. In FTC v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co.,49 the United States Supreme Court held that a
demonstration in a television commercial of the effectiveness of
shaving cream when shaving sandpaper was deceptive because
the commercial used not sandpaper but plexiglass to which sand
had been applied.50 The Court found it irrelevant that sandpa-
per could be shaved using the shaving cream and that real sand-
paper would have appeared to television viewers as plain colored
paper"1 and ruled that the commercial deceived viewers by lead-
ing them to believe that they were seeing an experiment that
used real sandpaper. 52
In his dissent to Colgate, Justice Harlan advanced as a
proper test "whether what is shown on the television screen is
an accurate representation of the advertised product and the
claims made for it."53 Perhaps a more relevant criticism of Col-
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 58.
49. 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
50. Id. at 377.
51. Id. at 376.
52. Id. at 390.
53. Id. at 398 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part). Justice Harlan suggested that under
1982]
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gate is that the public interest is not served by prohibiting a
practice that can have no injurious consequences.54 If no one is
misled by an accurate representation of the nature or quality of
the product, it should make no practical difference to consumers
whether real or simulated props are used in an advertisement, so
long as the net impression is accurate.55
The true rationale for the Colgate result may be that ad-
vanced by the Court in FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 56 which pro-
hibited respondents from selling yellow pine as "California white
pine." The Court ruled that one product may not be sold under
the name of another even if the products are equivalent and the
substitution results in savings to the consumer.57 It further ob-
served that "the public is entitled to get what it chooses, though
the choice may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps
by ignorance. '5' Thus, wrongfulness may inhere not only in the
damaging effect of a misrepresentation but in the intrinsic im-
propriety of a dishonest but innocuous misrepresentation. A
misrepresentation is actionable as a per se unfair or deceptive
practice even though it creates an accurate net impression, as in
Colgate, or a net impression that is inaccurate but beneficial, as
in Algoma.
The effect of the broad federal interpretations of deception,
if read into the UTPA, is potentially enormous. If the South
Carolina courts choose to follow these interpretations, the Act
would require the strictest honesty in commercial dealings. A
the majority opinion, "an advertiser must achieve accuracy in the studio even though it
results in an inaccurate image being projected on the home screen." Id. at 397-98. Thus,
the advertiser's product might look either better or worse, and the accuracy in the studio
might create a deceptive net impression. See id. at 398.
54. Id. at 396-98.
55. Cf. Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd sub nor. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 829 (1956). The Court dismissed a counterclaim under Lanham Act § 43(a), 15
U.S.C. § 1125a (1976), alleging that the trademark "Glass Wax" on glass cleaner contain-
ing no wax was a misleading, false description that injured the plaintiff, a wax products
manufacturer. According to the court, "[counter-claimant] has not shown damage or
likelihood of damage due to the fact that any substantial number of reasonable custom-
ers were misled or likely to be misled as to the nature of the product ... or that if they
had known the true facts, they most likely would have purchased a different product
.... " 129 F. Supp. 940.
56. 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
57. Id. at 78.
58. Id.
486 [Vol. 33
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consumer potentially has a cause of action under the UTPA
whenever he or she is injured as a result of a merchant's misrep-
resentation, regardless of the merchant's intention to deceive or
the reasonableness of the consumer's reliance on the misrepre-
sentation.5 9 Conservative state courts might resist such a poten-
tially revolutionary cause of action that could largely supplant
the traditional fraud actions and remove the barriers to recovery
they present. Nevertheless, the UTPA is state law, and the legis-
lature has expressly indicated its intention that the courts inter-
pret its substantive provisions with the guidance of federal in-
terpretations of similar language in the FTC Act. Strong
authority exists to support a broad reading of the UTPA's prohi-
bition of deception by the South Carolina courts.
2. The Unfairness Doctrine.-The federal courts and the
FTC have interpreted the FTC Act's prohibition against unfair-
ness even more broadly than they have construed the Act's pro-
hibition against deception. In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.
(S&H),60 the United States Supreme Court held that in making
determinations of unfairness, the FTC, "like a court, of equity,
[can consider] public values beyond simply those enshrined in
the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws." 61
In a footnote, the Court quoted with apparent approval the ele-
ments announced by the FTC in its proposed "Cigarette Rule"
for determining whether a practice is unfair:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been pre-
viously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has
been established by statutes, the common law, or other-
wise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the penum-
bra of some common-law, statutory, or other established con-
cept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial
injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen). 62
Unfortunately, the Court's opinion offered no additional gui-
59. See notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra.
60. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
61. Id. at 244. For a more extensive catalog of acts and practices commonly held to
be unfair under § 5, see Craswell, The Identification of Unfair Acts and Practices by the
Federal Trade Commission, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 107 (1981).
62. Id. at 244-45 n.5, quoting from Staterient of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regu-
lation Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation
to the Health Hazards of Smoking. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964).
1982]
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dance for determining standards of unfairness.
Four months after S&H, the FTC elaborated on its criteria
for unfairness in Pfizer, Inc.,63 in which it dismissed a complaint
against a sunburn ointment manufacturer for violating section 5
by failing to substantiate efficacy claims for its product before
advertising. 64 Instead of delineating precise standards for deter-
mining unfairness, the Commission seized on the Court's S&H
comparison of the FTC to a court of equity and took an even
more flexible approach to unfairness than that contained in its
proposed Cigarette Rule:
An unfairness analysis will take into account many basic eco-
nomic facts and considerations, and will permit a broad focus
in the examination of marketing practices. Unfairness is poten-
tially a dynamic tool capable of a progressive, evolving applica-
tion which can keep pace with a rapidly changing economy.
Thus as consumers, products, and marketing practices change
in number, complexity, variety, and function, standards of fair-
ness to the consumer may also change.6 5
The Commission concluded that "the making of. an affirmative
product claim in advertising is unfair to consumers unless there
is a reasonable basis for making that claim"6 because of "the
imbalance of knowledge and resources between a business enter-
prise and each of its customers.
'67
63. 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972). The FTC alleged two violations in its complaint-one for
deception and the other for unfairness. On the deception charge, complaint counsel ar-
gued that the company impliedly represented that scientific studies or tests which pre-
ceded the representations substantiated the claimed pain-relieving properties of the sun-
burn ointment, and that this implied representation had the capacity to deceive
consumers. Id. at 54. Complaint counsel also alleged an unfair trade practice in advertis-
ing a product without adequate scientific testing. Id. The Commission reiterated its net
impression standard for deception cases, pointing out that deceptive acts or practices
usually take one of three forms: "(1) advertising containing direct representations, (2)
advertising containing representations which reasonably may be said to be implied by
the advertising, or (3) advertising which fails to disclose material facts." Id. at 58. On the
facts adduced, it was found that such prior substantiation could not reasonably be im-
plied from the advertisements and therefore that no showing of a deceptive act or prac-
tice had been made.
64. Id. at 73.
65. Id. at 61.
66. Id. at 62.
67. Id. The "reasonable basis" standard was said to be not solely a "reasonable
man" test. Id. at 64. Although the precise formulation of the reasonable basis standard
was left to case by case determination, the Commission listed five criteria relevant to the
factual issue of what constitutes a reasonable basis for advertising claims:
488 [Vol. 33
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As in the case of the advertising props in Colgate, section 5
violations do not require that the consumer be injured by decep-
tion if the advertiser's claims are without reasonable basis. Even
though a product performs as advertised, lack of a reasonable
basis for the performance claim justifies finding an unfair act or
practice in violation of section 5 because the consumer bears the
"unavoidable risk that the product may not perform as
advertised." 68
The first trade regulation rule based solely on the unfairness
doctrine after S&H and Pfizer prohibits the assertion of certain
claims and defenses, including the holder-in-due-course doc-
trine, in consumer credit transactions. 9 Pursuing its power rec-
ognized in S&H to act as a court of equity, the FTC announced
that it had "weighed compelling equities in the market in reach-
ing [the] conclusion that the mechanical abrogation of consumer
claims and defenses is unfair to consumers. '70 The Commission
followed its broad Pfizer standard of unfairness based on mar-
ketplace economics and the unequal bargaining power between
consumers and merchants. It decided that the cost of merchant
misconduct could be minimized if creditors were forced to police
the marketplace by avoiding promissory notes from merchants
whose shoddy goods or unethical business conduct would give
consumers valid defenses in actions for debt incurred with them.
Creditors would then be forced to absorb losses due to merchant
misconduct with the result that consumer credit transactions
would more accurately reflect their true cost to society. Accord-
ing to the Commission, "only when prices approach or approxi-
mate real social costs do consumer choices in the market tend
(1) the type and specificity of the claim made-e.g., safety, efficacy, dietary,
health, medical; (2) the type of product-e.g., food, drug, potentially hazardous
consumer product, other consumer product; (3) the possible consequences of a
false claim-e.g., personal injury, property damage; (4) the degree of reliance
by consumers on the claims; (5) the type, and accessibility, of evidence ade-
quate to form a reasonable basis for making the particular claims.
Id. at 64.
68. Id. at 67.
69. Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1980). See In
re All-State Indus., Inc., 75 F.T.C. 465 (1967), aff'd, 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1980).
70. Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, Statement of Basis and Pur-
pose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506 (1975).
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towards optimal allocation of society's resources. ' 71
In its trade regulation rule on ophthalmic advertising, which
was designed to defeat anticompetitive state regulation of the
eyeglass industry, the FTC made its unfairness standard even
more flexible and general.7 2 According to the Commission, the
determination of unfairness requires two inquiries: "(1) Whether
the acts or practices result in substantial harm to consumers. In
making this determination both the economic and social benefits
and losses flowing from the challenged conduct must be as-
71. Id. It has been pointed out that this rationale is similar to that underlying the
common-law doctrine of strict products liability. Schwartz, Regulating Unfair Practices
Under the FTC Act: The Need for a Legal Standard of Unfairness, 11 AKRON L. REV. 1,
11 (1977). Commentators have debated whether the FTC Act has goals other than eco-
nomic efficiency. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrRUST LAW 7-33 (1978); R. PosNaR,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8-22 (1977); Schwartz, "Justice" and Other
Noneconomic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 918 (1979); Sullivan, Economics
and More Humanistic Disciplines: What are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust., 125
U. PA. L. REv. 1214 (1977).
72. Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Advertising of Opthalmic Goods and Ser-
vices, 43 Fed. Reg. 23,992, 25,995 (1978), remanded in part for reconsideration, Ameri-
can Optometric Ass'n v. FTC, 626 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Ophthalmic
Rule]. The Ophthalmic Rule is the first trade regulation rule derived from a proceeding
conducted completely under the Magnuson-Moss FTC Improvement Act. Pub. L. No.
93-637 (1975), amending § 18 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301-2310 (1976). The Rule is
noteworthy for the FTC's position that it has the power to preempt state statutes re-
stricting advertising of eyewear and eye examinations. Enforcement of the rule would be
accomplished by making it an unfair practice for an individual seller to fail to advertise
in order to comply with "nonfederal" (i.e., state) laws or private codes of conduct.
Ophthalmic Rule, supra, § 456.4, 43 Fed. Reg. at 24,007. The declared intent is not to
compel informative advertising, but to make this prohibition self-enforcing by providing
a defense to any proceeding against a seller or refractionist who advertises "in a
nondeceptive and fair manner" contrary to nonfederal law. Id. § 456.9(c), (d), 43 Fed.
Reg. at 24,008. In other words, the rule voids state laws restricting such advertising. As
noted by the court,
the Commission's proposed preemption of state law is almost as thorough as
human ingenuity could make it. Consequently, the Commission has at least
approached the outer boundaries of its authority and may have infringed on
that deference to the states' exercise of their police powers dictated by the
principles of federalism.
626 F.2d at 910.
If valid, a preemptive rule such as this could create an anomalous situation in a state
having both a UTPA and prohibitions that have been preempted by an FTC rule: (1) the
state law prohibits specified conduct; (2) the FTC rule makes it a § 5 violation to abide
by state law; (3) the state's UTPA adopts FTC "interpretations" of § 5 as state law
guides; therefore, (4) does abiding by state law prohibiting the specified conduct violate
state UTPA? Presumably, this type of problem would be avoided in South Carolina by
the express exemption for "actions or transactions permitted by any other South Caro-
lina State law." S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40 (1976).
12
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sessed, and (2) Whether the challenged conduct offends public
policy. '7 3 The Commission found a public policy against restric-
tions on commercial advertising in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council7 4 and Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona,7 5 in which the United States Supreme
Court held that the first amendment protects the consumers'
right to receive price information. As an alternative, the Com-
mission advanced the public policy of fostering free markets"8
and noted that functioning free markets require competition,
"availability of information, a lack of excessive transaction costs
incurred by or benefits accruing to persons external to the deci-
sion process, and mobility of resources."'7 On the substantial
harm issue, the Commission found that lack of price information
injured consumers by depriving them of "the opportunity to sat-
isfy their needs at the lowest available price. '7 8 Therefore, the
Commission concluded, "[a]cts or practices which cause con-
sumer injury by creating, exploiting, or failing to alleviate mar-
ket imperfections other than a lack of or threat to competition
can be unfair within the meaning of Section 5.1179
The FTC's expansion of its jurisdictional reach has evoked
stiff business opposition. When the Commission proposed its
trade regulation rule on cigarette labeling, Congress responded
to intense political pressure by passing its own cigarette labeling
law-a watered-down version of the proposed FTC rule.80 More
recently, Congress' enactment of the 1980 Federal Trade Com-
mission Improvement Acts' expressly restricted the Commis-
sion's consideration of a proposed trade regulation rule to limit
or prohibit television advertising addressed to children,
nicknamed the "kid-vid rule,"' 2 by prohibiting promulgation of
any rule based on the theory that -advertising of this type consti-
73. Advertising of Ophthalmic Goods and Services, Statement of Basis and Purpose,
43 Fed. Reg. 23,992, 24,000-01 (1978).
74. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
75. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
76. 43 Fed. Reg. at 24,001.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976).
81. Pub. L. No. 96-252 § 11(c), 94 Stat. 374 (1980).
82. Id.
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tutes an "unfair act or practice." 83 Thus, the Commission may
now predicate any kid-vid rule only on a finding of deception.84
Congress further prohibited any new rule-making proceedings to
regulate "any commercial advertising" 85 on the basis of unfair-
ness during the fiscal years 1980, 1981, and 1982.6
Given recent changes in the nation's political climate, some
question exists whether the FTC will continue its aggressive use
of the unfairness doctrine to prohibit perceived abuses in com-
merce. The Commission lost much of the flexibility it once had
in applying the doctrine when Congress legislated itself a veto
power over all newly issued FTC trade regulation rules.8 7 The
unfairness doctrine is, however, sufficiently established to be a
potent weapon in state unfair trade practice arsenals. Courts so
inclined could measure any practice allegedly injurious to free
markets or consumer protection against the unfairness standard
under the UTPA.
B. Antitrust Standards
Enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 189011 estab-
lished a national policy of maintaining competition in unregu-
lated sectors of the economy by prohibiting concerted actions in
restraint of trade,8 9 conspiracy to monopolize, monpolization,
and attempts to monopolize.90 'In its 1911 decision in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States,91 the United States Supreme Court in-
terpreted the Sherman Act's broad proscription of concerted re-
straints of trade as prohibiting only "unreasonable" restraints.
92
83. Id.
84. The FTC subsequently terminated its rulemaking proceeding concerning chil-
dren's television advertising. [1981] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1033, at
A-27.
85. Pub. L. No. 96-252, supra note 81, § 11(c).
86. Id.
87. Id. §, 21(a). Congress also demonstrated its displeasure by placing other restric-
tions on FTC activities, including its proposed rule for the funeral industry, id. § 19, and
the elimination of FTC authority to cancel a federally registered trademark "on the
ground that such mark has become the common descriptive [generic] name of an article
or substance." Id. § 18.
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
89. Id. § 1.
90. Id. § 2.
91. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
92. Id. at 60.
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Congress' unfavorable reaction to Standard Oil resulted in the
FTC93 and Clayton Acts."' The Clayton Act supplements the
Sherman Act's narrow "Rule of Reason" standard by prohibiting
specified conduct whose effect may be a substantial lessening of
competition.96 The purpose of the Clayton Act is to prevent such
potential or incipient restraints from ripening into full-blown
unreasonable restraints of trade. Section 2 of the Clayton Act, as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,96 prohibits various
forms of anticompetitive price discrimination;97 section 3 prohib-
its similar exclusive dealing and tying arrangements; 98 section 7
prohibits corporate mergers and acquisitions that may restrain
competition;99 and section 8 prohibits interlocking directorates,
that is, boards of directors of competing corporations having the
same members, when this practice might have an anticompeti-
tive effect.10 In each of these areas, the Clayton Act substitutes
an incipiency standard for the Sherman Act's Rule of Reason
standard and relaxes the standard of proof necessary to estab-
lish a violation.Although the FTC Act is not by definition, an antitrust
law, 1' conduct that violates the Sherman or Clayton Antitrust
Acts is by definition unfair and therefore violates section 5 of
the FTC Act. Because the federal antitrust acts provide states
and their citizens private antitrust causes of action for treble
damages and injunctions, the FTC Act would add little if its an-
titrust coverage were limited to conduct already prohibited by
the other acts. In their'interpretations of the FTC Act, however,
the courts have developed doctrines prohibiting anticompetitive
conduct that has not matured into a full antitrust violation or
that falls within a technical gap in the antitrust acts. Conse-
quently, the UTPA permits state and private causes of action
for conduct not directly prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton
Acts.
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976).
94 Id. §§ 12-27, 44.
95. Id. §§ 13(a), 14, 18.
96. Id. § 13.
97. Id.
98. Id. § 14.
99. Id. § 18.
100. Id. § 19.
101. Id. § 12.
i9821
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1. The Incipiency Doctrine.-Under the incipiency doc-
trine, the United States Supreme Court in FTC v. Motion Pic-
ture Advertising Service Co. 10 2 stated that conduct which has
not yet blossomed into a full-blown violation of the Sherman
Act may nevertheless violate section 5 of the FTC Act:103
It is . . . clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was
designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act-to stop in their incipiency acts and practices
which, when full-blown, would violate those Acts, as well as to
condemn as "unfair methods of competition" existing viola-
tions of them.104
Despite this dictum in Motion Picture Advertising, questions
persisted whether the incipiency doctrine should apply equally
to Clayton Act cases.1 05 Both the Clayton Act and the FTC Act
are supplementary to the Sherman Act, and the use of one sup-
plementary act to supplement another is subject to question.
Moreover, the Clayton Act imposes its own incipiency standard,
which expressly prohibits conduct whose effect "may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monop-
oly."10 It may thus be argued that the application of the section
5 incipiency test to Clayton Act violations would amount to ap-
plying a double incipiency test, or "incipient incipiency."
10 7
Despite these arguments, the Supreme Court appears to
have settled the issue in FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., °10 in which the
FTC challenged a franchised dealer program that offered dealers
a package of special services and facilities in return for the deal-
102. 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
103. Id. at 394-95. See Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941)
("[I]t was the object of the Federal Trade Commission Act to reach not merely in their
fruition but also in their incipiency combinations which could lead to these and other
trade restraints and practices deemed undesirable.").
104. 344 U.S. at 394-95.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 12-27, 44.
106. Id. §§ 14, 18.
107. See, e.g., Howrey, Interplay of Unfair Competition and Antitrust Doctrine
Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 12 IDEA 119 (1968); Oppenheim,
Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act with the Sher-
man and Clayton Act, 59 MICH. L. REv. 821 (1961); Comment, An Expanded Use of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 1082 (1969). See also
Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C.L. REv. 227, 250 n.108 (1980).
108. 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
[Vol. 33
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ers' agreement not to handle competing shoe lines.'09 The FTC
did not attack these arrangements as exclusive dealing contracts
under section 3 of the Clayton Act, which would require a show-
ing that their effect "may be to substantially lessen competi-
tion," 110 but instead proceeded under section 5 of the FTC
Act'11 and did not make such a showing. 1 2 The Court upheld
the Commission's position and stated:
We reject the argument that proof of this § 3 element [present
likelihood of substantial harm to competition] must be made
for ... our cases hold that the Commission has power under §
5 to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency without proof
that they amount to an outright violation of § 3 of the Clayton
Act or other provisions of the antitrust laws. 13
The extent of the showing, if any, of incipient injury to
competition that must be made to sustain a violation of section
5 remains a question. Per se violations of the antitrust laws
clearly would also be per se violations of section 5. Similarly,
inasmuch as the Clayton Act's incipiency standard requires no
more than a reasonable probability of the proscribed anticompe-
titive effect, section 5 of the FTC Act must require something
less for incipient Clayton Act violations.' Finally, the proper
109. Id. at 317-18.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
111. Id. § 45(a)(6).
112. 384 U.S. at 318-19.
113. Id. at 322. The FTC's cease and desist order was based on a quasi-tying theory:
"Respondent's practice of conditioning the benefits of membership in the plan to adher-
ence to the restrictive terms of the franchise agreement for the purpose of foreclosing
other manufacturers from selling to its franchisees is akin to the operation of tying
clauses generally held as inherently anticompetitive." Brown Shoe Co., 62 F.T.C. 679,
715 (1963). See Day, Exclusive Dealing, Tying and Reciprocity-A Reappraisal, 29
OHIO ST. L.J. 539 (1968).
114. The "reasonable probability" test for Clayton Act cases was explained in Corn
Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945), as follows:
It is to be observed that § 2(a) does not require a finding that the discrimina-
tions in price have in fact had an adverse effect on competition. The statute is
designed to reach such discrimination "in their incipiency," before the harm to
competition is effected. It is enough that they "may" have the prescribed ef-
fect. But ... the use of the word "may" was not to prohibit discriminations
having "the mere possibility" of those consequences, but to reach those which
would probably have the defined effect on competition.
Id. at 738. Cf. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 50 (1948) (violation of § 2(a) results
when "[tlhere is a 'reasonable possibility' that competition may be adversely affected"
by price discriminations in sales to competing customers). It has been suggested that the
17
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standard for application of section 5 to conduct falling within
the Sherman Act's Rule of Reason test can be inferred from the
Court's interpretation of the Clayton Act's incipiency standard:
the proper test under section 5 for Rule of Reason conduct
would appear to be a reasonable probability that, if the conduct
were to continue unabated, an unreasonable restraint of trade
would result.
2. The "Spirit" Doctrine.-In addition to reaching actual or
incipient violations of the antitrust laws, section 5 of the FTC
Act has been used to reach conduct that violates the policy or
spirit of those laws, even when the conduct may not be techni-
cally within their terms. As stated in Brown Shoe, the FTC has
"broad power" '115 to declare trade practices unfair, especially
those that "conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actually vio-
late those laws.'1
1 6
One widely discussed illustration of the "spirit" doctrine is
the Commission's application of section 5 to the receipt of dis-
criminatory promotional allowances in violation of the policy,
but not the letter, of the Robinson-Patman Act. 11 7 The Clayton
Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, established a
policy for special treatment of specified types of conduct, such
as price discrimination. 18 Although section 2(d) prohibits a
seller from granting discriminatory promotional allowances" 9
and section 2(f) prohibits a buyer from inducing or receiving dis-
criminations in price,120 the Act does not address the issue of a
buyer's inducing or receiving discriminatory promotional al-
lowances. In Grand Union Co. v. FTC,'2' the Second Circuit
relevant legal standard under § 5's incipiency test is somewhere between a "reasonable
probability" and a "reasonable possibility" that the proscribed effect on competition
would occur. Averitt, supra note 107, at 249; MacIntyre & Volhard, The Federal Trade
Commission and Incipient Unfairness, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 407, 422 (1973).
115. 384 U.S. at 321.
116. Id. According to the Court, "This program obviously conflicts with the central
policy of both § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act against contracts which
take away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market." Id.
117. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act of 1936, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a
(1976).
118, Id. § 13.
119. Id. § 13(d).
120. Id. § 13(0.
121. 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 33496
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Court of Appeals upheld a section 5 cease and desist order
against the latter conduct on the ground that it violated the pol-
icy of the Robinson-Patman Act. As explained by the court,
"[j]urisdiction, perhaps, has been expanded from the technical
confines of § 2(d), but only fully to realize the basic policy of the
Robinson-Patman Act, which was to prevent the abuse of buy-
ing power." 22
Because gaps in the scope of the Clayton Act are covered by
the general proscriptions of the Sherman Act,123 use of section 5
may be unnecessary. The only difference in the treatment of
conduct under the two antitrust acts is the Clayton Act's incipi-
ency standard; 24 but standards for application of the two acts
have tended to coalesce over the years. 2 5 Because section 5 has
its own incipiency standard, conduct contrary to the policy of
the Clayton Act, but technically beyond its reach, is subject to
section 5 coverage as an incipient violation of the Sherman Act.
A more difficult question is how section 5 might apply to
conduct that is neither an actual nor an incipient violation of
the broad terms of the Sherman Act. Two gaps in the Sherman
Act coverage have evoked FTC interest. The Act proscribes both
(1) concerted restraints (a contract, combination, or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or conspiracy to monopolize) and (2) unilat-
eral monopolization or attempt to monopolize. 2 6 Treating uni-
lateral but consciously parallel restraints as contrary to the
spirit of the Sherman Act would avoid the requirement of con-
certed action. Similarly, characterization of an oligopoly as a
"shared monopoly" contrary to the spirit of the Sherman Act
avoids the requirement of proving monopolization or attempt to
monopolize. The complexities of the antitrust concepts of con-
scious parallelism, implied conspiracy, oligopolistic interdepen-
dence, and shared monopoly are beyond the scope of this arti-
122. Id. at 98.
123. See OPPENHEIM, WESTON, & McCARTHY, supra note 21, at 19.
124. See notes 101-113 and accompanying text supra.
125. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 595 (1977); Day,
supra note 113, at 545.
126. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ... or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 2 of the
Act makes it unlawful to "monopolize, or .attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
.... " 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
4971982]
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cle. 127 Suffice it to say that extension of section 5 to expand the
Sherman Act beyond concerted restraints of trade, monopoliza-
tion, and attempts to monopolize has not gained widespread
support, and in the current political climate prospects for exten-
sion seem dim. 128 A similar prognosis may be made for any at-
tempt in the near future to accomplish the same ends under an
expanded theory of unfairness, by which the FTC might con-
sider "public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter
or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws." 129
C. Conclusion
The courts and the Federal Trade Commission have inter-
preted section 5 of the FTC Act as prohibiting almost any kind
of anticompetitive conduct, 130 as outlawing commercial represen-
tations that do not convey an accurate impression accurately
achieved,131 and as prohibiting any commercial conduct that'can
be considered unfair in the broad tradition of equity jurispru-
dence.1 32 The South Carolina UTPA, by permitting state courts
to follow federal guidance in interpreting the Act's prohibition
of unfairness and deception, provides the potential for incorpo-
rating these principles into South Carolina law.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has yet to indicate the
extent to which it might adopt federal precedent or how broadly
it might construe its powers under the Act. This much, however,
is clear: the Act gives the courts of South Carolina the power to
declare illegal any "unfair" practice that has the reasonable like-
127. See generally OPPENHEIM, WESTON & McCARTHY, supra note 21, at 205-213.
128. In a 1972 "shared-monopoly" complaint in In re Kellogg Co., [1972] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) T 19,898 (complaints and orders), the FTC charged the big three ready-
to-eat cereal producers with maintaining a noncompetitive oligopoly through interdepen-
dent conduct that demonstrated shared monopoly power. The complaint was dismissed
in September 1981 by an administrative law judge for failure to substantiate either a
conspiracy to monopolize or shared monopoly theory. Id. The judge noted that his deci-
sion did not consider the issue of whether a "shared monopoly" violated section 5. Id.
The following week, the FTC dismissed an eight-year proceeding to restructure the oil
industry, In re Exxon Corp., [1974] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 120,388 (complaint and
orders), further dimming the likelihood of an extension of the spirit doctrine to "shared
monopolies."
129. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 425 U.S. 233, 244 (1972). See generally 1 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 71, 1 307; Averitt, supra note 107, at 227.
130. See notes 88-129 and accompanying text supra.
131. See notes 33-59 and accompanying text supra.
132. See notes 60-87 and accompanying text supra.
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lihood of injuring consumers or competitors or improperly re-
ducing competition in the marketplace. Depending on the
courts' response, consumers and businesses may be able to assert
an independent cause of action, unfettered by the restrictions on
traditional remedies, to seek damages (trebled for willful viola-
tions), costs, and attorney's fees,1 3 when they are injured by de-
ceptive, unfair, or anticompetitive conduct. Under similar state
statutes, courts in other states have granted UTPA remedies to
tenants complaining of landlord misconduct,"3 to automobile
owners upon a manufacturers' refusal to fulfill warranty obliga-
tions,135 to boat owners complaining that repairmen exceeded
cost estimates,13 6 to home purchasers when builders failed to
make promised repairs, 13 7 and to persons denied an orally prom-
ised right to terminate a written sales contract.'38 Although the
remedy is relatively untried in South Carolina, an attorney rep-
resenting a consumer injured in any commercial transaction
should consider bringing a cause of action under the UTPA.
II. CONDUCT EXEMPTED FROM UTPA REGULATION
A. Statutory Exemptions
The UTPA does not prohibit all conduct that is unfair, de-
ceptive, or anticompetitive. It creates four separate exemptions
for conduct otherwise falling within its scope: (1) conduct per-
mitted by state law or under federal or state laws administered
by a regulatory officer or agency; (2) innocent publication by the
media of misleading advertising; (3) trade practices regulated by
state insurance law; and (4) practices that comply with statutes
administered by the FTC.I3 9
Of the foregoing, the permitted conduct exemption is the
most ambiguous and difficult to apply, and several alternative
interpretations are possible. "Permitted" may mean "not pro-
hibited," but this interpretation renders the remaining three ex-
133. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (1976).
134. Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574 (1977), cert. denied, 241
S.E.2d 843. See generally Annot., 89 A.L.R.3D 449 (1979).
135. Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1978).
136. Hyland v. Zuback, 146 N.J. Super. 407, 370 A.2d 70 (1976).
137. Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977).
138. Our Fair Lady Health Resort v. Miller, 564 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
139. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40 (1976).
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emptions superfluous, strictly limits the UTPA's scope, and
frustrates the legislative purpose of providing general protection
against unfair and deceptive acts or practices.140 The legislature,
by declaring that "[tihe powers and remedies provided by this
article shall be cumulative and supplementary to all powers and
remedies otherwise provided by law,' 141 has clearly expressed its
intention that the UTPA is to have general application and is to
provide additional remedies. Interpretations of the Act's limited
exemptions should not frustrate this intent.
"Permitted" may also be read as "regulated" or "con-
trolled" by another federal or state agency or by state law. This
interpretation renders the third and fourth exemptions superflu-
ous, severely limits the coverage of an act intended to have gen-
eral application, and raises the difficult problem of determining
when another agency or state statute sufficiently regulates or
controls challenged conduct to establish the exemption.
A proper interpretation of "permitted" should have com-
mon meaning and acceptance, should be consistent with general
principles of judicially implied repeal, preemption, and exemp-
tion, should permit meaningful distinctions between the four
statutory exemption clauses, and should promote the legislative
purpose of making the act an effective enforcement tool and a
remedy of general application against unfair or deceptive acts
and practices. All of these desiderata are satisfied by reading
"permitted" in the generally accepted sense of "expressly per-
mitted." This interpretation limits the scope of the statutory ex-
emptions to conduct expressly removed from the reach of the
UTPA by the remaining three examples and conduct whose reg-
ulation under the UTPA would create a conflict with other laws
or regulations that expressly permit the challenged conduct.
Unfortunately, the South Carolina Supreme Court has not
accepted this interpretation. In State ex rel. McLeod v.
Rhoades,142 the only reported South Carolina decision on the
permitted conduct exemption, the court interpreted "permitted"
as meaning "regulated" and held that stock transactions regu-
lated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and by the
140. See id. § 39-5-20(a).
141. Id. § 39-5-160.
142. 275 S.C. 104, 267 S.E.2d 539 (1980). For further discussion of Rhoades, see
Business Law, 33 S.C.L. REV. 1 (1981).
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state's Uniform Securities Act were exempt from the UTPA.143
This holding frustrates the purpose of the UTPA as an act of
general application and creates inconsistencies, superfluities, and
confusion with the remaining UTPA exemptions.
Rhoades may best be explained as an attempt to apply the
implied repeal doctrine under the guise of a claimed statutory
exemption. Several federal securities cases, for example, demon-
strate that when Congress places a field under a pervasive regu-
latory scheme, courts may imply an exemption from antitrust
laws for conduct expressly governed by the regulatory statute
even though no regulatory action has been taken.14 4 State ex rel.
McLeod v. Fritz Waidner Sports Cars, Inc.,1 45 illustrates the
proper approach to considering whether an exemption to the
UTPA should be implied.146 Use of the doctrine of implied ex-
emption is preferable to a distortion of the statutory exemption
that may, at best, result in confusion or, much worse, frustrate
the legislative purpose of the UTPA
1 47
143. Id. at 107, 267 S.E.2d at 541.
144. See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975);
Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Silver v. New York Stock Exch.,
373 U.S. 341 (1963).
145. 274 S.C. 332, 263 S.E.2d 384 (1980).
146. See notes 141-144 and accompanying text supra.
147. A literal application of the Rhoades test could totally destroy the UTPA: (1)
conduct "regulated" by a federal agency is exempt from the UTPA; (2) The FTC regu-
lates all unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting interstate commerce under § 5 of the FTC Act; therefore, (3) all such conduct is
exempt from the UTPA. Considering the broad jurisdictional reach of the FTC under
the commerce clause, most business practices of any significance would be exempt from
the UTPA under this syllogism, even without considering the exemption for conduct
regulated by a state agency or officer or permitted by any other South Carolina state law.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40(a) (1976).
Further confusion is created by the procedural rule adopted in Rhoades: "Initially
the burden is on the party seeking the exemption to demonstrate its applicability. Once
the exemption is demonstrated, the complainant must then show that the specific act in
question does not come within the exemption." 275 S.C. at 107, 267 S.E.2d at 541. Sev-
eral practical problems arise in complying with the Rhoades procedure. Proof of an ex-
emption is clearly an affirmative defense. Rhoades shifts the burden of going forward to
the opposing party once a prima facie exemption has been shown. Rhoades also estab-
lishes that defendants can prove exemptions on demurrer. How then is the complainant
to rebut? He presumably cannot deny the affirmative exemption defense in his com-
plaint because any attempt to do so would be anticipatory replication and should make
the complaint demurrable. See Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
Complainant can only convert the demurrer into a summary judgment motion and file
affidavits showing that the specific challenged conduct is not exempt. The South Caro-
lina rules neither provide for this conversion nor prohibit it. See S.C. CIR. CT. R. 44. Cf.
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B. Preemption or Implied Repeal
Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, states may not enforce laws that conflict with federal
law.148 This prohibition is flexible, however, and state statutes
may operate concurrently with federal laws absent inconsistent
provisions' or a clear Congressional intent to occupy the regu-
lated area exclusively.149 Congress has expressed no such intent
in the antitrust and unfair trade practices area, and courts have
inferred none.150 The UTPA is not only consistent with section
5(a) of the FTC Act, but is identical in formulation. Inconsisten-
cies should not arise through judicial interpretation of the South
Carolina Act because interpretations of the FTC Act are to
guide state courts. Clearly, the federal antitrust laws and the
FTC Act have not preempted the UTPA.
South Carolina's only reported decision on preemption of
the UTPA is consistent with this reasoning. In Fritz Waidner,151
the South Carolina Supreme Court found "no conflict between
remedies"1 52 provided by the UTPA and by a federal odometer
disclosure act, s3 nor any intent that the federal act was to "su-
persede and otherwise limit consistent state law remedies for
false odometer disclosures." 1"
Closely related to preemption under the supremacy clause is
the limitation on state power under the commerce clause.155 The
commerce clause creates an inherent limitation on state power
to regulate interstate commerce even in the absence of federal
legislation, 15 6 but the limitation is far from absolute. The United
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (dismissal for failure to state a cause of action). Unfortunately,
summary judgment is little better than a demurrer as a vehicle to decide such "impor-
tant questions of novel impression" having such "far reaching effects." See 274 S.C. at
333, 263 S.E.2d at 385.
148. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
149. Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
150. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 71, 208; Mosk, State Antitrust En-
forcement and Coordination with Federal Enforcement, 21 ABA ANTITRUST SEc. REP.
358, 367 (1962); Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 653
(1974).
151. 274 S.C. at 333, 263 S.E.2d at 385. See Business Law, supra note 142, at 2 n.5.
152. 274 S.C. at 333, 263 S.E.2d at 385.
153. Federal Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, Pub. L. No. 95-513,
86 Stat. 951 (1972) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)).
154. Id.
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
156. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 71, 220a.
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States Supreme Court explained in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.157
that courts must balance legitimate state interests against bur-
dens on interstate commerce to determine if a state act violates
the constitutional provision.15 '8 The UTPA is in obvious har-
mony with the FTC Act and the federal interest in fair business
practices generally. It places no anticompetitive or disfunctional
burden on interstate trade. Under Pike, the UTPA does not un-
constitutionally impede the interstate flow of goods and
services.
159
III. REMEDIES UNDER THE UTPA
The UTPA's stiff economic sanctions make the Act a poten-
tially forceful weapon in the consumer protection arsenal. Pri-
vate plaintiffs who have suffered "an ascertainable loss of money
or property, real or personal,"' 60 are entitled to recover their ac-
tual damages, which, in the case of a willful violation, a court
may treble and supplement with any other relief it deems neces-
sary and proper.' Successful private plaintiffs may also recover
reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 16 2 In actions brought by the
attorney general, the state may recover civil penalties of up to
$5,000 for each willful violation'63 and up to $15,000 for viola-
tions of injunctions issued under the Act.'6
Although methods for determining private plaintiffs' dam-
ages are reasonably clear, the provision for civil penalties con-
tains a latent ambiguity. When confronted with a continuing
failure to obey an injunction or with multiple solicitations or
157. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
158. Id. at 142.
159. Cf. State v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 71 S.C. 544, 561, 51 S.E. 455, 461
(1905) (state antitrust law cannot regulate imported goods). Although the decision in
Virginia-Carolina Chemical was made by a circuit court on a demurrer and the com-
merce clause issue was not appealed and although the UTPA, unlike the state antitrust
law, is fully consistent with federal law and contains on its face no undue burdens on
interstate commerce, several federal courts have misread the holding. See In re Wiring
Device Antitrugt Litigation, 1980-1981 Trade Cases 63,581 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Cor-
rugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 1980-1981 Trade Cases 1 63,163 (D. Tex. 1979);
Three J. Farms v. Alton Box Board Co., 1979-1980 Trade Cases 1 62,423 (D.S.C. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979).
160. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (1976).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. § 39-5-110.
164. Id.
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sales in violation of the Act, a court assessing penalties must
first determine what constitutes a discrete violation that triggers
a separate assessment of the statutory penalty. Concerning con-
tinuing failures to obey an injunction, federal precedent is clear.
Section 5(1) of the FTC Act provides that "each day of continu-
ance of such failure or neglect shall be deemed a separate of-
fense."'168 Under the UTPA's provision that courts may be
guided by federal authority, a strong argument exists that a new
UTPA violation occirs every day a party fails to obey an injunc-
tion. In cases of multiple solicitations or sales, the federal courts
have interpreted language in the FTC Act similar to that in the
UTPA as providing separate penalties for every act that would
amount to a separate violation of an order standing alone. In
United States v. Reader's Digest Association, 66 the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed a civil penalty in the amount of
$1,750,000 against Reader's Digest for violations of an FTC con-
sent order and held that each individual mailing of promotional
materials constituted a separate violation. This determination
resulted in a total of 17,940,521 violations. Recognizing that its
holding would expose a violator to "the possibility of enormous
potential liability,1 117 the court pointed out that any actual
award is subject to the limitation of judicial discretion."' 68
In its discretionary determination of the penalty's size, the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware con-
sidered five factors: "(1) the good or bad faith of the defendants;
(2) the injury to the public; (3). the defendant's ability to pay;
(4) the desire to eliminate the benefits derived by a violation;
and (5) the necessity of vindicating the authority of the FTC."''"
On the second point, the district court emphasized that "proof
of actual confusion or deception is not required."' 70 The Third
Circuit endorsed the district court's view that, "[tihe principal
purpose of a cease and desist order is to prevent material having
a capacity to confuse or deceive from reaching the public ...
[t]hus, whenever such promotional items reach the public, that
165. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
166. 1981-1982 Trade Cases 11 64,247 (3d Cir. 1981).
167. Id. at 74,028.
168. Id.
169. United States v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 494 F. Supp. 770, 772 (D. Del. 1980).
170. Id. at 778.
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in and of itself causes harm and injury."171 The fact that the
Digest obtained more than $5,000,000 in gross subscription reve-
nues from its promotions established that the magazine derived
substantial benefit from the violation.
.One of the most perplexing questions in UTPA enforcement
is whether a civil penalty or treble damages can be assessed in
the absence of a prior UTPA injunction against the challenged
conduct. The question is how may a willful violation be estab-
lished? How should a person know that a practice violates the
UTPA unless it has been declared to violate the Act by a prior
injunction issued under the Act? A comparison with the enforce-
ment procedure under the FTC Act illustrates the difficulty.
Case by case refinement has made workable the intentional-
ly flexible and therefore vague FTC Act proscriptions against
"unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices. ' 172 When South Carolina enacted the UTPA, the FTC
Act provided no cause of action for civil penalties unless the de-
fendant had violated a cease and desist order previously entered
against him.17 3 This remains the rule for orders against unfair
methods of competition-that is, antitrust-type violations-but
the Magnuson-Moss FTC Improvement Act of 1975174 altered
penalty provisions for violations of cease and desist orders
against "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"-that is, con-
sumer protection violations.1 7 5 Under the Magnuson-Moss Act,
any violator of a final cease and desist order may be liable for
civil penalties "whether or not such person ... was subject to
such cease and desist order, ' '176 if he had "actual knowledge that
such act or practice is unfair or deceptive and is unlawful under
[section 5 of the FTC Act]. ' 7 In addition, civil penalties may
now be assessed against violators of trade regulation rules pro-
scribing an unfair or deceptive practice who have "actual knowl-
171. 1981-1982 Trade Cases, at 74,030 (quoting 494 F. Supp. at 777-78).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
173. The attorney general may bring an action for a civil penalty under § 5(1) of the
FTC Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45(1)(1970). Under § 16(a)(1), the FTC may sue to recover a civil
penalty if the attorney general fails to do so within forty-five days after written notifica-
tion by the FTC. 15 U.S.C. § 56 (1976).
174. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193, 2198 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
175. Id.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)(1)(B)(1) (1976).
177. Id. § 45(m)(1)(B)(2).
1982]
27
Day: The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act: Sleeping Giant or
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
edge or knowledge fairly implied . . that such act is unfair or
deceptive and is prohibited by such rule."17 8 Although these
amendments broaden the enforcement remedy to permit a civil
penalty action against one not directly subject to a consumer
protection cease and desist order, the FTC still may not bring a
civil penalty action unless the party has violated a preexisting
trade regulation rule or cease and desist order and had actual or
implied knowledge that the act or practice was unfair or decep-
tive and was prohibited by a trade regulation rule or by section
5 of the FTC Act.
By analogy to the federal interpretations, defendants may
argue that complainants can seek a civil penalty or treble dam-
ages under the UTPA only for conduct violating a previously is-
sued injunction under that Act.- They may also argue that the
1975 FTC Improvement Act provisions are inapplicable -to
UTPA interpretations because these provisions did not amend
section 5(a) of the FTC Act. 79 This argument concludes that the
federal interpretive guides require violation of a previously is-
sued injunction by one subject to that injunction for the viola-
tion to be willful or knowing. The flaw in this otherwise logical
argument is that it renders meaningless the UTPA's specific
provisions of a more substantial civil penalty for the violation of
an injunction.180 The structure of the Act, therefore, indicates
that something less than a violation of an injunction is needed to
establish a willful or knowing violation.
The element of willfulness in FTC proceedings for civil pen-
alties is relatively easy to establish. In order to secure industry-
wide enforcement, the Commission sends a copy of relevant or-
ders or synopses of relevant decisions 81 to all members in an
affected industry and keeps records of the companies it has so
informed. 82 In addition, the Commission may seek civil penal-
ties for a trade regulation rule violation when, on the basis of
objective circumstances, the defendant had imputed knowledge
178. Id. § 45(m)(1)(A).
179. See note 121 supra.
180. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-110 (1976). Under subsection (a), a civil penalty not
exceeding $5,000 per violation is provided for willful violations of the UTPA, id. § 39-5-
20(a), and a civil penalty not exceeding $15,000 per violation is provided for violating an
injunction issued pursuant to § 39-5-50.
181. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
182. FTC CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 22, at 934.
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that his conduct violated the rule. 83 Implied knowledge of this
sort arguably should supply the requisite evidence of willfulness
under the UTPA, but the analogy is not that simple.
Although the UTPA directs state courts to follow FTC and
federal court interpretations of the FTC Act in enforcing the
UTPA, courts may not fully comply with this legislative man-
date. Thus, a clear FTC Act violation may not be a violation of
the UTPA. Even in areas of great certainty under the FTC Act,
state policy may vary from federal policy. For example, although
resale price maintenance is a per se violation of the FTC Act,
1 84
South Carolina has retained its Fair Trade Act 85 despite the re-
peal of the federal fair trade exemption,"8" and the state act per-
mits resale price maintenance otherwise violative of the federal
antitrust laws. The Ophthalmic Rule, an FTC rule designed to
defeat anticompetitive state regulation of the eyeglass industry,
is a further example of an FTC policy expressed in a trade regu-
lation rule that was contrary to a state law.187 Presumably, even
an obvious FTC Act violation would not be considered a viola-
tion of a state's UTPA if a contrary local policy exists.
The willfulness standard under the UTPA thus is not clear
because state courts have not defined the scope of prohibited
activity. Confusion is likely to continue until the state, through
its courts, establishes its own decisional guides to test a defen-.
dant's willfulness. Under these circumstances, proof of willful-
ness in many actions under the UTPA may, in fairness, require a
showing of knowledge of a prior state court ruling by way of an
injunction against the challenged act or practice.
IV. UTPA ENFORCEMENT
A. Private Damage Actions
As the UTPA enters its second decade, it is impossible to
measure with any precision the impact of its private damages
provisions""' on business practices in South Carolina. The ab-
183. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2) (1976).
184. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 125, § 243(b).
185. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-7-10 (1976).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 1, as amended by Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, [1976]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 25,125.
187. See notes 72-79 and accompanying text supra.
188. Inexplicably, the UTPA provides for no private action for an injunction., per-
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sence of any reporting system for cases that do not reach the
South Carolina Supreme Court creates a substantial barrier to
discovering the Act's effect on private litigation. The state's
clerks of court could alleviate this problem by complying with
the statutory directive that they mail to the attorney general a
copy of the complaint, judgment, or decree in any UTPA dam-
age action filed in their office.189 Unfortunately, the Act provides
no method for enforcing this mandate, and it is apparent -that
officials have followed it irregularly.
The lack of data on lower court activities is particularly dis-
turbing because most private UTPA actions do not proceed be-
yond trial. Indeed, the Act's impact is probably greatest in the
area of precomplaint settlements, about which public informa-
tion is seldom available. Nevertheless, with no reported case on
the merits in over ten years, it would appear that the UTPA has
not thus far fulfilled the expectations of its ardent supporters.
One might have thought that the legislative mandate that
the courts follow FTC and federal court interpretations of sec-
tion 5 of the FTC Act would throw the courts open to a flood of
new consumer and competitor cases.19 0 In light of the great po-
tential for the UTPA to generate liberal consumer protection
theories, why has it not been enforced to a greater extent by
private actions in South Carolina? The answer may lie in the
difference between private and public consumer protection ac-
tions. The FTC's activities in expanding the tests for unfair and
deceptive practices have concentrated on obtaining cease and
desist orders to prevent conduct that may injure competition or
consumers in the future.""1 For recovery under the UTPA, pri-
vate plaintiffs must show an "ascertainable loss of money or
property, real or personal, as a result of [conduct violating the
act]." ' 2 Therefore, proof of an incipient antitrust violation19 3 or
hops because the Act's main concern is consumer protection. Although injunctions may
be of little use to deceived consumers, businesses often find that prospective relief is the
only effective remedy against a competitor's continued unfair methods of competition.
189. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (1976).
190. The propriety of using legal standards developed by the FTC as a governmen-
tal enforcement agency in private actions has been the subject of debate. See Leaffer &
Lipson, supra note 3, at 533 n.81.
191. See id. at 526 n.31 ("Given the conceptual difficulties retrospective relief under
§ 5 was thought to raise. . ., the absence of useful rules of trade regulation law relating
to compensation for consumers is not surprising").
192. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (1976).
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conduct merely having the capacity to deceive"" is insufficient
to maintain a *private damage action under the UTPA.
B. State Actions
The Consumer Fraud and Antitrust Section of the South
Carolina Attorney General's Office consists of five attor-
neys-three for consumer fraud cases and two for antitrust en-
forcement. 95 This minimal contingent is made possible by a fed-
eral seed-money grant under the Crime Control Act of 1976.19'
The federal grant program ended in 1980, and as the federal
money runs out, the state's enforcement of the UTPA appears to
be in serious jeopardy.19
To the extent that the goal of the UTPA was to supplement
FTC-style enforcement on behalf of consumers at the local level,
the state's efforts have been a dismal failure. Like the FTC, the
attorney general's office has too few resources for the task. Nev-
ertheless, the attorney general's office has used the UTPA exten-
sively in prosecuting the same types of consumer fraud cases
that were prosecuted before its enactment 9 8 because the Act
does not require proof of the common-law elements of fraud or
deceit.199 Limited resources, however, have forced the consumer
fraud division to concentrate on only the most egregious viola-
tors. Consequently, the state has not yet had the opportunity to
test the outer boundaries of such FTC theories as capacity to
deceive and unfairness.
The only state antitrust complaint to date under the UTPA
193. See notes 102-114 and accompanying text supra. See J. Truett Payne Co. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 101 S. Ct. 1923, 1927 (1981)(citing Perkins v. Standard Oil Co.,
395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969)("To recover treble damages ... a plaintiff must make some
showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws were designed to
prevent.")).
194. See notes 33-59 and accompanying text supra. See Hinchcliffe v. American Mo-
tors Corp., [1981] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-i, -3 ("To satisfy the 'ascer-
tainable loss' requirement, a plaintiff need only prove that he has purchased an item
partially as a result of an unfair or deceptive practice or act and that the item is different
from that for which he bargained.").
195. Interviews with John Cox and Joseph Isaacs, Assistant Attorneys General for
the State of South Carolina.
196. Crime Control Act of 1976, ch. 46, § 3739, 90 Stat. 2415, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
3739 (Supp. 1979).
197. See note 151 supra.
198. See notes 151-153 supra.
199. See notes 33-59 and accompanying text supra.
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was filed in October 1981.200 Until then, state antitrust enforce-
ment took the form of negotiated settlements, and the largest
monetary settlements resulted from price-fixing violations of the
Sherman Act by members of the highway construction indus-
try.20 1 As of this writing, these settlements have resulted in pay-
ments totaling approximately $1,000,000 to the state highway
department,20 2 the victim of price-fixing conspiracies. Mean-
while, the attorney general's office has negotiated confidentially
with seven alleged violators of the UTPA, and resulting settle-
ments have brought approximately $100,000 into the state's gen-
eral fund.20 3 One of these settled cases was based on an attempt-
to-monopolize theory; four concerned allegedly unlawful "tying"
arrangements-the theory underlying the October 1981 antitrust
complaint, and two involved alleged price-fixing. 2°4
South Carolina's antitrust enforcement efforts are question-
able on several counts. While South Carolina has concentrated
on vertical restraints of trade, most other states have focused on
horizontal price-fixing cases, which occur when businesses agree
to restrict competition between themselves. 205 The rationale for
the latter focus has been similar to that in the consumer fraud
activities in South Carolina-such violations take priority be-
cause of the public interest in prosecuting restraints that are per
se illegal. Moreover, federal antitrust experience has demon-
strated the complexity and proof problems inherent in monopo-
lization and vertical arrangements short of resale price mainte-
nance. Just as the FTC has retreated from its major
200. State ex rel. McLeod v. B.M.D. Dev. Corp., No. 81-CP40-3485 (D.S.C., filed
Oct. 1981).
201. Highway construction bid-rigging cases have accounted for the largest share of
the Justice Department's antitrust caseload during 1980-81. See [1981] ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 999, at A-3 (Jan. 1, 1981). Indictments in South Carolina
include United States v. A.T. Sistare Constr. Co., [1981] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
45,081 (Case 2871)(D.S.C. May 28, 1976); United States v. R.B. Pond Constr. Co., [1981]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,081 (Case 2896)(D.S.C. July 16, 1981); United States v.
Smith Grading & Paving, Inc., [1981] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) t 45,081 (Case
2901)(D.S.C. Aug. 27, 1981); United States v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., [1981] TRADE REd.
REP. (CCH) 1 45,080 (Case 2846) (D.S.C. Dec. 18, 1980); United States v. The Dickerson
Group, Inc., [1981] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,080 (Case 2826a) (W.D.N.C., Nov. 25,
1980).
202. See note 194 supra.
203. See id.
204. Id.
205. OPPENHEIM, WESTON, & MCCARTHY, supra note 21, at 160.
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monopolization cases,2 °8 the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice has indicated an intention to concentrate on
horizontal conspiracies in restraint of trade.0 7 The legality of
such vertical arrangements as exclusive dealing, tying, exclusive
distributorships, and geographical and customer allocations has
long been the subject of heated debate among economists and
antitrust scholars. 208 Even the Supreme Court has had difficulty
formulating a consistent approach to treatment of vertical re-
straints and, within a fifteen-year period, has alternated its view
of vertical territorial allocations from a Rule of Reason ap-
proach"" to a per se test 210 and back again to the Rule of Rea-
son.211 Congress has also stepped in by legislatively reversing the
FTC position regarding vertical arrangements in the soft drink
bottling industry.21 2 Under the circumstances, it is not clear why
the attorney general's office should choose to embark on the
stormy and uncharted waters of vertical restraints of trade at a
time when other antitrust enforcers at both the federal and state
levels have chosen to concentrate on simpler and more economi-
cally significant horizontal conspiracies among competitors. The
wisdom of the current state approach is particularly questiona-
ble in light of the state's limited resources.
Despite its complexities, however, this approach has proved
to be the line of least resistance to obtaining quick capitulation
and voluntary settlements. The advantage of the settlement ap-
proach lies in its utter simplicity. Assume the following situa-
tion: A business is accused of selling one product or service only
on the condition that the purchaser also buys another product or
service; that is, it ties the sale of one to the purchase of the
other. Normally, this simple allegation raises a number of com-
plex antitrust questions: (1) are there really two products that
206. See note 128 supra.
207. According to Richard J. Favretto, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Anti-
trust Division, Department of Justice, the Division does not consider resale price mainte-
nance illegal per se, despite judicial decisions to the contrary. Under the Division's new
view, resale price maintenance, like other vertical arrangements, "should not be discour-
aged when its purpose and effect is to promote rather than restrict competition in the
broader interbrand marketplace." [1981] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 509, at 3.
208. See generally OPPENHEIM, WESTON, & MCCARTHY, supra note 21, at 578, 642.
209. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
210. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
211. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
212. Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3503 (1976).
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can be tied, or is there only one; (2) is the purpose of the tie
anticompetitive or promotional; (3) is there sufficient economic
power in the tying product to have the proscribed foreclosure
effect in the tied product; (4) do economic justifications make
the tie reasonable or necessary in the circumstances? The re-
spondent claims that the conduct is not a tie and that, if it were,
the tie is procompetitive, justified, and legal. Once the attorney
general's office becomes involved, respondent is faced with a
Hobson's choice: If he is willing to enter into an informal settle-
ment, stop the challenged practice, and make a "voluntary" pay-
ment to the state, the file is closed and the whole matter is kept
confidential. Otherwise, respondent faces a public trial. Given
the uncertainty and costs of trial, the chance of civil penalties
and treble damages, and the certainty of adverse publicity, a set-
tlement is preferable.
This confidential settlement procedure is subject to criti-
cism on several grounds. From the standpoint of the respondent,
it is similar to blackmail or hush money; a refusal to settle would
result in public disclosure. From the standpoint of the potential
private treble-damage plaintiff, the confidential settlement pro-
cedure results in the deprivation of the benefit of using a judg-
ment in a state suit as prima facie evidence of a violation of the
UTPA.213 Indeed, because of the confidential status of the settle-
ment, the potential private plaintiff may be left unaware that a
cause of action exists. Finally, the procedure ignores the public's
right to know what actions have been taken in its name in an
area of substantial public interest.
214
A more basic problem with the informal confidential settle-
ment procedure is its failure to follow the procedure specified in
213. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(c) (1976).
214. The South Carolina Freedom of Information Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-40-10
to -110 (Supp. 1980), does not guarantee that the public will learn of such actions taken
in its name. First, if a settlement is truly confidential, the public remains unaware that
any information exists. Second, it is not clear that the Freedom of Information Act sub-
jects relevant information to public inspection. In a voluntary settlement, the respondent
does not admit any wrongdoing, and the file is closed without finding a violation. The
attorney general has ruled that the Administrator of Consumer Affairs is not required to
release information connected with a determination that a consumer complaint is
groundless. 1976-77 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 11, No. 77-132. Similarly, police criminal investi-
gatory files are not subject to inspection under the Freedom of Information Act on the
ground that they are not "public records" within the meaning of S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-
20 & -30 (1976). 1976-77 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 146, No. 77-193.
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the UTPA for accepting an "assurance of voluntary compli-
ance." 215 According to the Act, "[a]ny such assurance shall be in
writing and be filed with and subject to the approval of the
court of common pleas having jurisdiction. '21 6 Compliance with
this directive would go far in satisfying the interests of the pub-
lic and of potential private plaintiffs, but it would also present
the likelihood of fewer negotiated settlements, because the ma-
jor leverage in the confidential settlement is its confidentiality.
Nevertheless, the legislature presumably considered the advan-
tages of confidential settlements when it formulated the UTPA
provision for voluntary settlements, and the attorney general's
practice contradicts the policy the legislature impliedly adopted.
The confidential settlement procedure raises other ques-
tions of propriety. The only payments authorized by'the UTPA
in accepting an assurance of voluntary compliance are a "volun-
tary payment . . . of the costs of investigation, ' 21 7 or "an
amount to be held in escrow pending the outcome of [a private
damages] action or as restitution to aggrieved buyers." 2118 Of the
approximately $100,000 collected thus far as voluntary payments
in confidentially negotiated settlements, no money was held in
escrow or used for restitution for injured consumers, and none
was retained by the attorney general's office for the costs of in-
vestigation. 219 The money instead was deposited in the state's
general fund, as if it had resulted from civil penalties.
The collection of settlement money for purposes other than
the benefit of victims of alleged violations or for reimbursement
of investigation costs is subject to question. The only other
UTPA provision for the collection of money for the state is the
civil penalty provision.220 The Act expressly requires that civil
penalties be levied only by a court when the court finds a willful
violation of the Act or the violation of a previously granted in-
junction.221 It would therefore appear that the collection of
money in confidential settlement proceedings violates the civil
penalty policy of the Act.
215. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-60 (1976).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See note 195 supra.
220. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-110 (1976).
221. Id.
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The public has other interests that may be prejudiced by
negotiated settlements of antitrust charges. First, the threat of
prosecution should not be used as a lever to coerce unfair terms.
The 1955 United States Attorney General's Antitrust Committee
Report made the following recommendation regarding antitrust
consent negotiation by the Department of Justice:
In consent negotiation, the Department should not seek relief
(1) deemed by the Supreme Court to transgress constitutional
boundaries; or (2) which in the particular case, could not be
reasonably expected after litigation. It has been urged that,
since the Division, no mere private litigant, enforces a federal
statute, it should demand whatever relief, in the public inter-
est, its bargaining position may coerce. We believe that view
ignores the prosecutor's responsibility to stay within statutory
and constitutional bounds. It threatens our goal of equitable
law enforcement and, accordingly, should be rejected.
222
For these reasons, it should be incumbent upon the South Caro-
lina Attorney General's Office not to coerce a settlement "which,
in the particular case, could not reasonably be expected after lit-
igation.1223 This policy should include coerced voluntary pay-
ments amounting to civil penalties for disputed conduct not
found by a court to be willful violations of the UTPA. Because a
common feature of all negotiated settlements, confidential and
statutory, is that the settlement "shall not be considered an ad-
mission of violation for any purpose, 224 any payment in the na-
ture of a fine or penalty is contrary to the terms of a voluntary
assurance agreement and to the UTPA.
Second, settlements should not be too lenient. When settle-
ment terms are kept confidential, a potential for abuse exists.
Federal consent decrees once presented a problem when inter-
ested parties sought to intervene and challenge their leniency. 225
The Clayton Act now requires the government to publish the
terms of all proposed consent settlements at least sixty days
222. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws 361 (1955), reprinted in 11 J. OF REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 1, 373 (1980).
223. Id.
224. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 39-5-60 (1976).
225. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 88 Stat. 1706 (1976), (amending 15
U.S.C. § 16). See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 330(f), (g) (1978); L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 125, § 243(b) (1977).
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before entry and to file a "competitive impact statement"226 set-
ting forth the facts of the case with an "evaluation of alterna-
tives to such proposal actually considered. ' 227 Furthermore,
before approving a consent decree, a federal court must decide
that the decree is "in the public interest 228 and, to this end,
may take testimony, consider the views of third parties, and per-
mit participation before the court by "interested persons or
agencies." 22 9 These requirements, however, have been criticized
as converting a settlement into a mini-trial and eliminating ben-
efits that might be gained by the parties and the public from a
negotiated settlement.23 °
Although South Carolina's current approach to settlements
errs in the other extreme, the state need not follow federal pre-
cedent too closely. A resolution may lie in a procedure that pro-
vides a reasonable balance between the public interest in being
informed, with some opportunity for input in appropriate cases,
and the desirability of encouraging voluntary settlements, in the
interest of saving taxpayers' money while achieving a fair result.
The UTPA's minimal requirements for accepting an assurance
of voluntary compliance are not oppressive and, as the only leg-
islatively prescribed procedure, should be implemented.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the effect of the UTPA has thus far been minimal,
the Act clearly has the potential, with the aid of some legislative
refinement, to provide a strong remedy for unfair and deceptive
acts or practices. The Act's supposed strength-its provision of
state and private causes of actions for all conduct coming within
the omnibus FTC jurisdiction-may be its chief weakness or
even undoing. Proving both willfulness and damages based on
conduct that an administrative agency has determined should be
enjoined in a particular instance may be impossible, as well as
inappropriate. One possible solution to the willfulness dilemma
226. 15 U.S.C. § 16(c)(ii) (1976).
227. Id. § 16(b)(6).
228. Id. § 16(e),
229. Id. § 16(f).
230. See OPPENHEIM, WESTON, & McCARTHY, supra note 21, at 1037; Note, The
I.T.T. Dividend: Reform of the Department of Justice Consent Decree Procedures, 73
COLUM. L. REv. 594 (1973).
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might be the adoption of a procedure similar to that in the FTC
Improvement Act of 1975, by which civil penalties and, in ap-
propriate cases, treble damages could be recovered for willful vi-
olations of a previously issued injunction, "whether or not such
person . . . was subject to such [injunction]," if he had "actual
knowledge that such act or practice is unfair or deceptive and is
unlawful under [the UTPA]. '12 31 This proposal would provide
the certainty and the due process notice that present broad pro-
scriptions arguably lack. Flexibility in enforcement would be
preserved in the power to issue the injunction under court ap-
proved standards guided by FTC and federal court interpreta-
tions of the FTC Act. Private enforcement might also be en-
couraged by amending the UTPA to provide a cause of action
for an injunction and a minimum statutory recovery 232 as an Ed-
ternative to actual or treble damages when incipient consumer
injury can be established by proof of, for example, capacity to
deceive.
Successful eradication of unfair and deceptive conduct can
probably only be accomplished by an effective consumer protec-
tion agency. A decade of experience has made it clear that the
attorney general's office is ineffective at controlling any conduct
short of fraud and deceit, a clear area in which the consumer has
standing based on demonstrable injury. Because the present
shortage of resources for consumer protection is likely to become
more serious, the legislature should empower the state's Office of
Consumer Protection, 33 which is already authorized to enforce
the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code,23' to administer
the consumer-as opposed to the antitrust-portion of the
UTPA. Most consumer matters, other than those involving
fraud or deceit, can be resolved informally outside the court-
room by a mediator with the power of the state behind him.
Combining enforcement of two related consumer protection stat-
utes under one agency would increase effectiveness and save the
state money.
Another possible solution to the problems of vagueness and
231. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B)(1) (1976).
232. Id. § 45(m)(1)(B)(2). Sixteen states provide for minimum statutory damages
(ordinarily $100 to $300). See Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 3, at 532.
233. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-6-501 (1976).
234. Id. §§ 37-6-103, -506.
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reasonable notice would be a provision for state trade regulation
rules similar to those issued under the FTC Act. Before the
adoption of section 57a of the FTC Act,2 35 the FTC's substantive
rulemaking power came from section 6(g) of the FTC Act, which
stated that the Commission had the power "to make rules and
regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this
[Act]. '2 36 In National Petroleum Refiners Association v. FTC,
23
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, facing the as-
sertion that section 6(g) allowed only procedural rules, found in-
stead that the section authorized the FTC "to promulgate rules
defining the meaning of the statutory standards of the illegality
the Commission is empowered to prevent. 238 The court also
stated that the rule-making power provides "an invaluable re-
source-saving flexibility"23 9 and is "fairer to regulated parties
than total reliance on case-by-case adjudication. '240 According
to the court, "evolution of bright-line rules is often a slow pro-
cess" and case-by-case adjudication lacks "the broad range of
data and argument from all those potentially affected that may
be flushed out through use of legislative-type rule-making proce-
dures."2 1 In advocating the increased use of rulemaking proce-
dures, the court emphasized that it "minimizes the unfairness of
using a purely case-by-case approach requiring 'compliance by
one manufacturer while his competitors [engaging in similar
practices] remain free to violate the act.' ,,242
235. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976 & Supp. 1979).
236. Id. § 46(g).
237. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
238. Id. at 698.
239. Id. at 681.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 684.
242. Id. (quoting Weinburger v. Bentax Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 653
(1973)). A judicial preference for rulemaking over adjudication was carried to the ex-
treme in Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 654 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1981), in which the court va-
cated an FTC order against Ford, its credit company, and a dealer that prohibited cer-
tain credit practices in repossessing and reselling automobiles. According to the court,
"agencies can proceed by adjudication to enforce discrete violations of existing laws
where the effective scope of the rule's impact will be relatively small; but an agency must
proceed by rulemaking if it seeks to change the law and establish rules of widespread
application." Id. at 601. Because the FTC ruling "changes existing law, and has wide-
spread application," the court felt that the matter should have been determined by rule-
making and that the FTC abused its discretion by proceeding through adjudication. Id.
Although the decision is contrary to § 5(m)(1)(B) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976),
which establishes a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for a knowing violation of
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Arguably, rule-making powers already exist under the
UTPA, which authorizes the attorney general to conduct hear-
ings and to "promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary.'243 In addition, the UTPA is much more explicit than
section 6(g) of the FTC Act, because it declares that such "rules
and regulations shall have the force and effect of law."24 4 The
contention, rejected in National Petroleum, that the rule-mak-
ing power was meant to be only procedural is even less applica-
ble to the UTPA.
Incorporation of rule-making power into the UTPA, how-
ever, similar to that acc6mplished by Congress in the 1975 FTC
Improvement Act,245 is preferable to reliance on the attorney
general's rule-making power. Such legislation should provide for
rule-making hearings similar to those required by the FTC,
which give "'notice to an entire segment of society of those con-
trols or regimentation that is forthcoming... [and] an opportu-
nity for persons affected to be heard.' ,,s4' Finally, the rule-mak-
ing power should reside in a single agency with general
administrative powers, namely the Consumer Protection Agency.
Because more effective control of willful violations can in some
instances be achieved by the attorney general's office, a provi-
sion for joint enforcement similar to one in the 1975 FTC Im-
provement Act 247 might be included. Although unfair trade legis-
lation in some states provides for consumer class actions, the
effectiveness of class actions in general is now in doubt because
of recent restrictive requirements for establishing a class and
providing the requisite notice.248 In any event, an effective con-
either a trade regulation rule or a final cease and desist order, it illustrates the strong
policy reasons favoring rule-making to create new and broadly applicable legal
principles.
243. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-80 (1976).
244. Id.
245. 15 U.S.C. § 57b-3 (Supp. 1979). Unfair Trade Practice Acts in four states now
authorize administrative rule-making by the attorney general. Lovett, supra note 3, at
737.
246. 482 F.2d at 682 (quoting NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 777
(1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
247. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (Supp. 1979).
248. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Justice Rehnquist, con-
curring in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), expressed considerable doubt
about whether large class actions of consumers are "ultimately of primary benefit to con-
sumers themselves; who may recover virtually no monetary damages, as opposed to the
attorneys for the class, who stand to obtain handsome rewards for their services." 442
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sumer protection agency armed with the necessary administra-
tive rule-making powers should be more effective and less cum-
bersome than consumer class actions.
Finally, the need for a state private damages remedy for an-
titrust violations is not as apparent as the need for consumer
protection. As noted above, the Clayton Act provides a private
cause of action for an injunction249 and mandatory treble dam-
ages 250 for injuries to business or property resulting from an an-
titrust violation. These antitrust provisions cover all conduct in
or affecting interstate commerce, and very little local activity
would not be included.2 51 The only real loss if antitrust conduct
were not covered by the UTPA would be caused by the unavail-
ability of the FTC Act's incipiency standard. As discussed ear-
lier, the appopriateness of this refinement in a state antitrust
action is highly questionable.25 2 For these and other reasons, the
clause "unfair methods of competition" should be deleted from
the UTPA, and the remaining prohibition should be expressly
limited to cover only those acts or practices that are "unfair or
deceptive" to the consumer.5 3 Consideration should then be
given to enactment of a standard state antitrust law, such as the
Uniform State Antitrust Law2' 4 proposed by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which is pat-
terned on the Sherman Act.
These proposals, if adopted, would result in more effective
consumer protection and improved antitrust law coverage that is
consistent with well established principles of antitrust law as en-
forced by the Department of Justice and as interpreted by fed-
eral courts.
U.S. at 346. See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 125, § 249.
249. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
250. Id. § 15 (1976).
251. See OPPENHEIM, WESTON, & McCARTHY, supra note 21, at 23; L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 125, § 233.
252. See notes 88-129 and accompanying text supra.
253. Compare Alternative Forms Number 2 & 3 of the UTPA, supra note 7. The
remedy would continue to be available to anyone damaged by the prohibited conduct,
whether a consumer or a competitor. Whether and how other forms of nonantitrust un-
fair competition should be regulated (such as commercial disparagement) is beyond the
scope of this article. Congress has given lengthy consideration to providing a federal pri-
vate cause of action for competitors injured by various forms of unfair competition and
misappropriation. See S. 1416, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
254. 7A UNIFORM L. ANN., Business & Finance Laws 733 (1978).
1982]
41
Day: The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act: Sleeping Giant or
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
42
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss3/7
